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Both  underdeveloped  countries  and highly  developed  countries
like  our  own  are  interested  in  economic  growth.  The  position
of agriculture  in the two  situations  is markedly  different.  Yet  the
impact  of  growth upon  agriculture  and upon  farm  people  is strik-
ingly  analogous.
In  underdeveloped  countries  agriculture  clearly  occupies  a key
position  in  economic  growth  and  industrial  development.  Agri-
culture  is  the  major  existing  industry.  Increase  in  agricultural
production  is  essential  to:  (1)  free  manpower  for  industrial  em-
ployment;  (2)  provide  food for the  growing  industrial  population;
and  (3)  provide exports to obtain foreign exchange for the purchase
of  industrial  capital  goods.
The problem  is one  of forcing  the rapid development  and adop-
tion  of  technical  improvement  in  agriculture  to  implement  this
bootstrap  operation.  The  arguments  turn  on  such  questions  as:
(1)  What level  of investment to direct to agriculture itself-should
capital funds be spent on tractors and other mechanized  equipment
and large irrigation works;  or should they be directed toward rapid
industrialization,  in  hopes  that  agriculture  will  follow;  or  should
the program be one of "balanced  growth"?  (2)  How rapidly should
-and  can-traditional  patterns  of  agriculture  and  rural  life  be
changed,  through consolidation  of farms, mechanization,  or perhaps
the  organization  of large-scale  collective  farms?
Different  countries  are  experimenting  with  different  answers
to such  questions  as these.  But  the basic  aim  is the  same-a maxi-
mum  rate of  growth  for the economy  as  a whole.  The  differences
in method  turn on  differences  in the willingness  of the  population
to tighten their belts today in the cause of future production,  their
willingness  to  give  up  traditional  ways  of  living  and  traditional
methods  of  production,  and  the  power  of  the  state  to  overcome
unwillingness  through  persuasion  and  coercion.
In  a  technologically  and  industrially  developed  country  like
the  United  States,  agriculture  no  longer  occupies  the  key  role  in
growth.  Our  farm  population  has  shrunk  to  a  small  fraction  of
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no longer the chief source  of industrial  manpower.  Our people  are
mostly well fed-our doctors tell many  of us that we are overfed-
yet we have  large surpluses  of  food and  fiber,  thanks to  our great
agricultural  productivity.  And  far  from  scrimping  on  domestic
consumption  to  release  farm  products  for  exchange  abroad,  we
cannot find enough foreign outlets for our surpluses even by giving
them  away.
In  this setting,  the  problem  of  balanced  growth  between  agri-
culture  and  industry  takes  on  a different  color.  Demand  for  farm
products  at  our  level  of  satiety  is  relatively  inexpansible;  the
potential  for rapid growth  is in other industries  and  services.  The
question  is  rather  whether  we  have  outdone  ourselves,  relatively,
in  agricultural  productivity.
Yet  we,  also,  are  concerned  with  problems  of  rural  social
adjustment-not,  however, in  order to  force  technological  advance
in agriculture,  but rather  to deal  with the disturbing  consequences
of the rapid rate of advance  that we have achieved  and that seems
bound  to  continue.
APPROACHES  TO  THE AGRICULTURAL  PROBLEM
AND  THEIR  IMPLICATIONS
Against  this  background  I  should  like  to  outline  some  of  the
main approaches  to the domestic  agricultural  problem, noting  their
implications  regarding  economic  growth.
First is the classical laissez-faire  approach.  This  approach  holds
that the whole effort  to "do something"  about  the "farm problem"
was  a mistake  in the  first  place;  that  the  bankruptcy  of  such  an
endeavor  is now so obvious  that only  the blind-or those  who  will
not see-can fail to recognize  this, and that the only sound solution
is to write off our losses as quickly  as possible  and then let nature
take  its  course.
This  line  of  action  is not  too  vocally  advocated  by  many  agri-
cultural  economists  at  present.  But  it  is  clearly  reflected  on  the
editorial pages of the Wall Street Journal,  for example,  albeit  with
a tone of considerable  despair  that the politicians-even  those now
dominating  the  Republican  party-will  ever  accept  this  sound
advice.
The  advocates  of  this  approach  argue  that  our  historic  rapid
economic growth was achieved under a laissez-faire economic policy,
and  they  see  no  reason  to  suppose  that  this  would  not  continue
to  work  if  given  the  chance.  They  consider  themselves  liberal
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of  true  liberalism.  In  the  struggles  of  one  and  two  centuries  ago
to free  the industrial  revolution  from restrictive  government  con-
trols, laissez-faire was, of course, the liberal  doctrine.  To the Amer-
icans for Democratic  Action who seek  to pre-empt  this title  today,
however,  the  laissez-faire  school  is  conservative  or  downright  re-
actionary.  Thus  does  history  shift  the  meanings  of  terms  with
semantic  content.
I suspect  that a  good many  more  people,  including  many  agri-
cultural economists, might espouse the laissez-faire  approach  today
if they  could contemplate  its shorter-run  implications.  But  simply
to  cut  loose  of  the  current  surplus  stocks  in  government  hands
is  a  thought  too  dreadful  to  contemplate.  And  the  laissez-faire
economists  are temperamentally  ill equipped  to offer  easy answers
to this problem.  To some of them, indeed, easy answers are morally
inconceivable.  We  got  ourselves  into this mess by  sinning  against
God's  economic  laws.  Having  sinned,  we  must  accept  payment  of
the penalties-and the longer we postpone  repentance,  the heavier
the  penalties  grow.
Most present-day  economists  are less ready,  however,  to  accept
laissez-faire principles as immutable laws of God. They take, rather,
more of what might be called an engineering  approach  to economic
problems.  To  the  engineer,  a  river  is  not  a  God-imposed  barrier,
the crossing of which is inherently sinful. If man wants to get across,
he designs a bridge.  Similarly, the job of the economist  is to devise
solutions  to  economic  problems.
To  the engineering-minded  economist,  then,  our  farm  problem
is  to  design  the  best  way  of  getting  where  we  want  to  go.  The
question  is,  where  do  we  want  to  go?  Here  we  find  a  whole
spectrum  of  schools  of  thought,  with  the  various  colors  shading
into  one  another and  combining  in various  ways.
One  of the  simpler  approaches  makes  economic  efficiency  the
exclusive  goal.  What  we  want  is  an  optimum  utilization  of  re-
sources  to maximize  output.  This is clearly  an  "economic  growth"
approach.  Modern  agricultural  technology  makes  possible  great
advances  in productivity,  so that  our needs  for food and fiber  can
be met with fewer resources  than  in the past-especially  with  less
labor.  The  trouble  is  that  our  traditional  market  mechanisms,
especially  the "factor markets"  (labor, to this  school, is a  "factor")
are  "imperfect":  they  have  bogged  down  in  the  immobility  of
resources.
What with the problem  being confused  by recessions,  wars,  and
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have  treated  only  the  symptoms.  Our  farm  programs  have  not
helped to overcome the underlying causes  but rather have retarded
the  needed  adjustments.
The  solution  in  this  light  is  straightforward:  labor  resources
need  to be  shifted  from  agriculture  into  more  productive  occupa-
tions-let  us devise ways  of overcoming  their  immobility  and shift
them.  This  may  require  overcoming  lack  of  information  through
an  expanded  industrial  employment  service  in  farming  areas.  It
may  require  loans  or  outright  grants  to  help  people  make  the
shift.  It  may require  vocational  training  services  to  equip  surplus
farm  labor for industrial  jobs.  Along  with this  might  go  programs
for  farm  consolidation  and  enlargement  for  those  who  stay  in
agriculture,  to  increase  their  productivity  more  rapidly  toward
the potentials  implicit  in  modern  technology.
A  good  many  people,  however,  including  many  reputable  agri-
cultural  economists,  feel  that  the  "efficiency"  approach  grossly
oversimplifies  our  goals. They  point out  that  farmers  are  not  just
a  "factor"-they  are  people,  with  human  aims  and  aspirations,
abilities  and  disabilities,  frustrations  and despairs.  They  point  out
that  the  farm  labor  force  has  been  decreasing  for  about  fifty
years,  and  that  in  the  last  decade  or  more  this  flow  has  been
great  if  not  torrential.  They  question  whether  rural  society,  or
the  nation, can  stand having  it  accelerated  further.  They question
the  possibility  of  retraining  large  numbers  of  farm  people,  es-
pecially  the  older  generation,  and  settling  them  happily-or  even
tolerably-into  nonfarm  jobs.  They  doubt  the  ability,  or  the  will-
ingness,  of  the  nonfarm  labor  markets  to  absorb  farm  people
faster,  even  with  industrial  prosperity.  In  varying  degree  they
prefer  to  sacrifice  efficiency  for  the  sake  of  human  or  humane
values,  and in  the name of  equity.
In effect this has been the approach of our existing price-support
program.  This  program  was  devised  as  an  emergency  measure  of
"agricultural  adjustment"  at  a  time  when  the  chronic  nature  of
agricultural  distress  was  obscured  by  the  aftermath  of  the  first
World  War and  the Great  Depression  of  the thirties.  It was  based
initially  on  the  premise  that  the transient  distress  could  be  over-
come  if  surpluses  could  be held  off  the  market  until  the  market
re-established  itself.  The  Federal  Farm  Board  of  the  twenties,
however,  was  caught  overstocked  in  the  collapse  of  the  thirties.
Obviously,  the  storage  of  surpluses  had  to  be  supplemented  by
the control  of production.  This was  attempted  through  the  regula-
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the  agricultural  industry.
Land  is  a necessary  resource  for  farming,  but other inputs  can
be  substituted  for  it  to  some  extent.  Under  the  adjustment  pro-
gram,  farmers  collectively  planted  fewer  acres,  at  least  to  the
basic  crops;  but  they  individually  increased  their  yields  on  the
acres they did plant through such methods as use of more fertilizer.
The adjustment  program  of  the  thirties  was  saved  from bank-
ruptcy  by  the  extraordinary  demands  of  the  second  World  War.
The accumulated  surpluses  were  used  up  and acreage  restrictions
were  changed  to  acreage  goals  for  expanding  production.  Mean-
while,  farmers  were  promised protection  from  the postwar  conse-
quences  by  the  guarantee  of  continuing  price  supports  for  an
"adjustment  period"  after the  war.
As all of you know, this "adjustment  period"  has been extended
and re-extended,  and  by now it  is apparent  that  agriculture  faces
not  a  transient  but  a  chronic  maladjustment.  More  fundamental
measures  are  needed.
One  school  of  inheritors  of  the  traditional  price-support  pro-
gram  argues  that  our  failure  lies  in  trying  to  adjust  supply  to
demand  through  controlling  the  single  input,  land.  The  solution
is  to  broaden  our  approach  to  supply  control.
The  most  far-reaching  proposal  along  this  line  is  issuing  to
individual farmers certificates specifying their shares of the market.
Annually,  commodity  by  commodity,  national  sales  quotas  would
be determined  in the  light of prospective demands  at  "fair" prices.
The  certificates  that each  farmer holds  would  tell him  how much
of the  commodity  he  could  sell.
He  would be  free  to  use  such combinations  of  land,  labor, fer-
tilizer,  and  other  inputs  as  he  chose  in producing  his quota.  The
restriction on total supply would automatically  assure  the intended
market  price,  but without  the interference  with production  effici-
ency  inherent  in  an  acreage  allotment  system.
To  encourage  efficient  adjustments,  the  certificates  would  be
salable.  The  farmer  wanting  to  enlarge  his  operations  could  do
so  by  buying  additional  certificates.  The  farmer  wishing  to  leave
farming  would  have  fewer  losses  to  write  off;  he  could  realize
something  from  the  sale  of  his  certificates.  Thus,  mobility  of  re-
sources  would  be  fostered  rather than hindered.
Compared with the present price-support program, this proposal
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and storage  operations  would  be reduced  to  a  minor  stabilization
operation.  (Something  would  have  to  be  done  about  the  present
stocks  on  hand,  but  this  is  a  transitional  problem  that  ony  other
proposal must face.)  Costs would be chiefly those of administration.
(Some people  shudder  at  the administrative  problems  that  would
be  involved,  quite  apart from  the  matter  of  costs.)
With regard to  economic  growth  effects,  the proponents  argue,
as already  pointed out,  that the proposal  would be  less restrictive
than the present program on farmers' freedom to operate  efficiently.
And  as compared  with  a  laissez-faire  policy,  they  argue  that  the
stabilization  of  markets would  give  farmers  greater  certainty  and
encourage  investment  in  technological  improvement.
Not  everyone,  however,  is  willing  to  discard  the  possibility  of
adjusting  production  by  regulating  the  use  of  land.  Some  would
argue,  rather,  that  we  just  have  not  gone  about  this in  the  right
way  or  carried  it far  enough.  The  way  to  take  land  out  of  pro-
duction  is  not  by  prorating  acreage  farm  by  farm,  crop  by  crop,
and year by year.  Rather, the government  should rent  or buy land
or otherwise  regulate its use  in accordance  with a long-range  plan.
This  approach,  likewise,  has  historic  roots.  The  most  recent
experiment  with it  is,  of course,  the  Soil  Bank.  But  the  approach
should not  be  written  off  too  lightly  on  the  basis  of  current  dis-
appointment with this particular  program. If we accept  the premise
that for  all  our technological  progress,  population  will  eventually
press  against  our  land  resources,  we  can  make  a  good  argument
that  the  government  has  a  duty  to  conserve  and  develop  these
resources,  mindful  of  the  welfare  of  our  grandchildren-not  to
mention the need for reserve productivity  capacity  to meet possible
emergencies.
This approach has particular  appeal  to the conservation  minded
and  those  who  think  of  natural  resources  as  a  public  heritage
to be publicly husbanded.  Such people are alarmed at the squander-
ing  of  resources  in  the  name  of  economic  growth.  They  suggest
that  we  recall  the  Dust  Bowl.  They  argue  for  sacrificing  some
current  output in the interests of  longer-range  growth  potential.
This  approach  receives  incidental  support  from  those  who  be-
lieve that in a society as affluent as ours continued growth  is going
to require  a shift  toward  more  of  the goods  and  services  that  are
best provided  socially rather  than privately-including  more parks
and rural recreation  areas.
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intensive uses  could be  costly  to the government.  Yet quite  a few
acres  could  be  diverted  with  the  sums  annually  being  spent  on
present  price-support  and  storage  programs.  Advocates  of  such
an approach would justify the current costs in terms of longer-range
growth  possibilities,  viewed  in  a  broader  perspective  than  that  of
merely the immediate farm problem.
The approaches  we have discussed  so far are designed  to shrink
the  supply  of  farm  products  to  match  the  demand.  The  logical
converse  is  to  increase  demand  to  match  supply.  This  approach
had  considerable  currency  during  the  depression,  when  under-
consumption  was an  obvious  problem.  It  led to  programs  for  dis-
tributing  free  food  to  the needy,  to the  Food  Stamp  Plan,  and  to
the  School  Lunch  Program.  Some  free  food  distribution  is  still
carried  on,  and  the  School  Lunch  Program  has  become  accepted
as a permanent  institution.  Since  the war, however,  so  few  people
have  been  too  poor  to  buy  food  that  large-scale  domestic  con-
sumption  subsidies  have  little appeal.  The  nutritionists,  who  once
took  considerable  interest  in  such  programs,  are  nowadays  more
concerned  with  people  being  overfed.
But  if  domestic  needs  are  being  met,  what  about  starvation
abroad?  Many  other  countries  have  large  unmet  needs  for  food,
and  we  have  developed  substantial  programs  for  foreign  surplus
disposal.  Unfortunately,  such  measures  involve  numerous  compli-
cations  not at  once  apparent  to those  who  see only surpluses  here
and hunger there. Problems arise with recipient countries regarding
the  terms  on  which  surplus  foods  are  furnished:  What  controls
are  needed  to  make  sure that  supplies  are  used  for  the  intended
purpose,  and  that  they  are  not  substituted  for  food  that  would
otherwise  be  purchased  through  commercial  channels?  Related
questions  are  raised  by  other  exporting  countries,  who  fear  that
our  surplus  disposal  impinges  upon  their  markets.
Recipient  countries,  on  their  part,  are  concerned  that  food
grants or  special  sales fit in with their own longer-range  develop-
ment programs. They understandably  do not wish to become reliant
upon supplies that depend upon the year-to-year whims of  generos-
ity of another  country.  This  raises for us questions  of longer-range
commitment.  Granted  that  we  face  a  chronic  surplus  problem,
how far are we willing to go in guaranteeing  to make food available
overseas  for  an  extended  period  of  years,  and  on what  terms?
Considerable  ingenuity has  gone  into  devising  ways of  dealing
with  such problems,  and  particularly  for making  food an integral
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foreign  disposals  still make  but  a  small dent  in  our domestic  sur-
pluses.
Meanwhile,  considerable  effort  goes  into  both  domestic  and
foreign  programs  to  improve  commercial  markets.  This  effort  has
two  aspects.  One  is making  marketing  more efficient.  This  has its
own  historic  origin.  We used  to  be  concerned  with  "what  goes  on
in  the  dark"  in  the  marketing  process  between  farmer  and  con-
sumer.  Research  has indicated  that  this  is  not  so  much  a  matter
of  exploitation  by monopolistic  middlemen,  as  we  once  believed,
but  more  a matter  of  backwardness  and  inefficiency  in the  oper-
ation  of  our  complex  marketing  system.
We  have  done  a  good  deal  toward  remedying  various  ineffi-
ciencies  through marketing research and extension.  Given  competi-
tive  markets,  the  benefits  of  this  improvement  are  bound  to  be
passed on to both producers and consumers.  But in a buyers' market
the  terms  of  trade favor  the  latter.
The  other  aspect  of  marketing  programs  is  the  expansion  of
demand through education,  advertising,  and promotion.  In extreme
form,  this  is  based  on  the  premise  that  if  farm  products  could
be  sold  as  aggressively  as,  say,  automobiles  we  would  have  no
surpluses.  This  is  not  to  argue  that  salesmanship  could  have  per-
suaded  consumers  to  eat all the bread  that could have  been  baked
from  our  surplus  wheat.  But  with  proper  "upgrading  of  diets,"
they  could  be  persuaded  to  eat,  in  the  form  of  animal  products,
the output from the farm resources  that go  into producing  surplus
wheat.  The  problem  is  not  one  of  enlarging  the  human  stomach,
but of filling  stomachs of present size with foods that require  more
farm  resources  per  pound  to  produce.
The  effects  of  our  programs  to  improve  markets  are  actually
difficult  to  measure.  Obviously,  the level  of postwar  efforts  along
these  lines  has  not  prevented  the  accumulation  of  surpluses,  as
some  hoped  that it  might.  It is  hard to  believe  that  even  a  much
greater marketing effort  would enable  demand  to keep  pace  with
our  technological  progress  in  farm  production.  We  can  make  a
plausible  argument,  however,  that farm  incomes  have been higher
than  they  would  otherwise  have  been.
Improving  marketing  efficiency,  in  any  event,  certainly  con-
tributes to economic  growth-especially  when  marketing costs  now
take  half  the  consumer's  dollar.  If  we  can  justify,  in  the  name
of  economic  growth,  spending  a  rapidly  increasing  share  of  the
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higher standards  of food  consumption  would seem entitled  to share
in  the  process.
CONCLUSION
I have reviewed,  quite  sketchily,  a  number  of main approaches
to the domestic farm problem.  I have  purposely  avoided  attaching
names to  them, for few  persons  in "real  life,"  as  we  say, advocate
any  one  of  these  approaches  to  the  exclusion  of  all  others.  My
descriptions  are  stereotypes.
I  have  not  mentioned  numerous  variants  and  combinations  of
these approaches-two-price  and multiple-price  plans, for example,
or  wider  use  of  marketing  agreements  or  other  commodity-by-
commodity  "self  help" plans,  or the much  debated role  of  contract
farming  and the  integration  of  production  and  marketing,  or  pro-
moting  the  use  of  farm  products  as  industrial  raw  materials.
Nor have  I  discussed  the  notion that  if  too  rapid technological
progress  is  the  cause  of  agricultural  distress  we  should  turn  off
the  stream  of  new  technology.  This  is  clearly  an  "anti-growth"
proposal,  but I  do not  think it  could be  done  anyway.
Also  I  have  dealt  only  with  long-range  approaches  and  have
not  discussed  proposals  for  dealing  with  the  surplus  stocks  on
hand-for  example,  giving  them  back  to  farmers  in  return  for
taking  a  production  holiday.
I  have  likewise  ignored  programs  of  rural  industrialization
and  community  development-an  approach  that  could  have  im-
portant  implications  for  economic  growth,  but  that  is  most  often
thought  of  as  attacking  the  separate  problem  of  low  income  of
sub-commercial  farmers, rather than that of commercial agriculture.
However,  I  have  said  enough,  perhaps,  to  suggest  that  we  are
not without  ideas  on what to  do about the farm problem,  and that
the  various  proposals  can  in  varying  degrees  be  reconciled  with
the  objective  of  economic  growth.  The  difficulty  is  not  lack  of
proposals-only  that  all  the  proposed  solutions  have  their  unat-
tractive as well  as their attractive  aspects.
In  closing,  I  should  like  to  mention  one  further  approach,  or
perhaps  an  attitude,  toward  the  problem-an  attitude  that  in
extreme  form  is  sometimes  called  Agricultural  Fundamentalism.
I  have  in  mind  the  view  that  unique  virtues  are  attached  to  the
old-fashioned  family  farm-in  farming  as  a  way  of life-that  we
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whole  democratic  society.
The name  of  Thomas  Jefferson  is commonly  mentioned  in  this
cause. But it is not uniquely an American point of view. The sturdy
tillers  of the soil are eulogized in the poetry of many nations.  I am
told  that  some  European  countries,  and  even  some  of  the  under-
developed  countries  in other parts  of  the  globe,  are  struggling  to
find  ways  of  modernizing  agriculture  that  nevertheless  preserve
certain  of  its  traditional  social  values.
This  is  a  viewpoint  that,  if  it  does  not  deny  the  objective  of
economic  growth,  at  least  questions  whether  all  the  things  that
are  justified in its name are necessarily best for mankind.  Progress
and efficiency  as values can be ruthless in submerging other values.
Should  we  not  consider  more  carefully  whether  they  take  us  in
all  cases  in  the  directions  in  which  we  want  to go-rather  than
pursue  them  willy-nilly?  In  the  last  analysis,  what  is  the  good
life,  and  how  is it  attained?
In  greater  or  less  degree,  this  attitude-or  sentiment,  if  you
prefer-tinges  the  thinking  of  most  of  us here  today.  Most  of  us
are  willing  ourselves  to  pay,  and  to  have  others  in  our  affluent
society  pay,  a  little  more  for  food  or  a  little  more  in  taxes  to
temper the winds of progress  if our farm  people  find these  winds
more  bitter  than  they  can  bear.
To  an  extent,  this attitude  underlies  our  admission  of  a  farm
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